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Program Budgeting for Police Departments
In Hartford, Connecticut, the residents of a large area in the center
of the Negro ghetto are victims of over one-third of the daylight resi-
dential burglaries in the city.' Yet during the daytime only one of
Hartford's eighteen patrol cars and none of its eleven foot patrolmen
is assigned to this area.2 Sections in the white part of town about the
same size as the central ghetto area receive slightly more intensive day-
time patrol even though the citizens in the ghetto area summon the
police about six times as often because of criminal acts.3 Maps showing
the daytime distribution of the automobile patrol in Hartford reveal
that in the downtown shopping district and the zone around the State
Capitol-an area which is in total about the same size as this central
ghetto district-there are approximately four times as many patrol cars
and eight times as many foot patrolmen as in the ghetto center.4
One would think that Hartford's decision to protect whites more
than Negroes would come under public scrutiny at least once a year,
when the City Council considers the police budget. But the traditional
police budgeting process is poorly designed to reveal any policy deci-
sions. As a result, not only racial discrimination in police protection,
but the relative effort expended against various types of crimes is likely
to be hidden from public officials examining the budget and even from
the police themselves. The traditional line-item budget does not even
give Council members the chance to channel funds to specific police
activities, such as foot patrol or residential burglary investigations.
1. According to an inspection of an operations map in the police conference room,
Police Headquarters, Hartford, Connecticut, November, 1966.
2. The area is bounded by: Main Street on the south; the city limits on the east,
Garden, Westland and Vine streets on the north; Albany, Garden and Mather streets on
the west. A second patrol car has recently been given as part of its responsibility a
small portion of this area. PoLIc DEPARTMENT, CITY OF HARTFORD, MANPOWER SURVEY
REPORT 33 (1963) and interviews with Hartford Police Department officials, November
1966.
3. Lists of calls for police service submitted by police officials at November, 1966,
budget hearings. The data are from the period January 1, 1966, through July 15, 1966.
4. POLICE DEPARTIENT, CITY OF HARTFORD, supra note 2. During the evenings this
imbalance is somewhat redressed. An evening foot patrol has recently been placed In the
heart of the ghetto area, for example. It is not suggested that any precise measure can
be obtained for one "proper" method of allocating Hartford s police manpower from the
above figures. The figures do suggest, however, that Hartfords lower-class Negro coin-
munity receives a disproportionately small share of the protection provided by the police,
See note 18 infra.




Rather they must choose among such amalgams as wages, office supplies
and capital investment.6
Hartford's budget process displays the shortcomings of traditional
budgetary review. The annual cycle begins in November, when the
Director of the Budget holds closed hearings in which he, the Chief
of Police, and the captains in charge of the various divisions of the
police (patrol, traffic, detectives, vice, records) discuss the department's
needs for the coming year. In these hearings last year each division
captain gave a brief speech describing the pressures on his division and
stating that even barely adequate service in the coming year would
require more men.7 The budget officer had special knowledge of police
operations, which enabled him to ask intelligent questions about police
policy and efficiency. But the police officials parried questions about
policy with assertions that their present practices were clearly "the
most efficient." The police rarely offered factual support for these
claims, but on most questions the budget official had no facts with which
to refute them. Thus questions of policy remained typically shrouded
by the myth that the only police policy was "full enforcement" of the
criminal law.8 In one illustrative exchange during the November, 1966,
hearings at Hartford a budget official managed to put together infor-
mation from two lists and a map on the wall and formulated the ques-
tion: "Why are your beats of equal size when there are fourteen times
as many complaints about crime coming from one as from the other?"
He was told that the present force distribution was the most effective
one possible, and the issue was dropped.
From the police officer's point of view, the function of these hearings
is to convey not information but an impression-an impression of a
dedicated and overworked department, beset by adversity, and desper-
ately in need of men and money. The budget official has no way to
6. Hartford's budget is not unique in this regard. See Appendx p. 833 infra.
7. This response is so typical among police officials that one director of Police Train-
ing has sarcastically reduced the entire police budgetary process to a formula: OSQ +
CI = MAPP: Operational Status Quo + Crime Increase = Morc Police Personnel. Klim-
kowski, The Police Budget: The Mistake of Using the OSQ + CI = MPP Formula, in
TnE PoLIcE YEARBooK 50 (1966).
This obsession with manpower increases has helped to produce a serious problem in
the police labor market. Many departments are now operating beneath their authorized
strength, because city councils have reacted to manpower appeals by raising the authorized
strength of the force without increasing salaries to attract enough recruits to fill te
newly authorized positions. Educational and intelligence standards for police recruits
have been lowered in many cities, a situation acknowledged in the recent report of the
President's crime commission. See THE PRESIDEN''S Co.itsslo. o. LAw LNFoncERa M
AND ADmisITRATioN or JusTicE, THE CAU.ENCE OF CRaLE iN A Farx Soctmv" 107 (1967).
8. See Goldstein, Police Discretion: The Ideal Versus the Real, 23 Pun. ADS %1N. IEv.
140 (1963).
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evaluate this impression or to measure the various requests against one
another, much less against the requests of other city departments. He
must rely for the most part upon his opinion of the chief's and the
captains' abilities.
In early December the City Manager holds public budget hearings.
Each city department is allotted about two hours to make its requests
for the coming year. The press is invited, but in the City Manager's
public hearing on the police department budget at Hartford in 1966
the only persons present were public officials. There was no effective
questioning or discussion of law enforcement policies. For example,
the police did not even bring them a map indicating deployment of
forces, so there was no way to discuss whether increases or merely ad-
justments in manpower were needed. Much of the time was spent dis-
cussing the purchase of a new switchboard for the police station.
During the next two months the Hartford City Manager prepares
the entire city budget. He submits it to the City Council in January,
in time for two private Council hearings and one public hearing before
approval in late February. At the public budget hearing held by the
City Council, schools and taxes are virtually the only topics of discus-
sion. The only public record in the last five years of any discussion
about the police department shows a complaint by one citizen that
police and firemen were paid too much."
Approximately twenty-five hours are spent each year in public and
private hearings on the police budget. At no time are the police called
upon to show, with any rigor, how they determine public "needs" for
police service and decide which demands for their services are to re-
ceive priority.
The form of the traditional budget document is one important
reason why time spent scrutinizing the police budget does not con-
tribute to review and control of police policy. The traditional account-
ing-style budget is designed to keep track, in minute detail, of the
expenditure of public funds. It is organized into such categories as
"personnel" (wages and salaries, overtime), "non-personal expense"
(gasoline, office supplies), and "outlay" (communications equipment,
furniture). It is an excellent device for assuring that public funds are
not lost or stolen, but tells almost nothing about what is done with
them. It does not show how police resources are being allocated, either
by neighborhood or by function. A citizen or councilman who wants
9. Hartford Courant, Feb. 1, 1966, at 15, col. 2.
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to know what types of activities the police are emphasizing needs a
great deal of unpublished data, such as maps of the car patrol districts
and the foot beats, lists of calls for service by neighborhood, and rec-
ords of case investigations. Even then, he must laboriously piece
together the information and attempt to coax inferences from frag-
mentary data. An efficiency-minded councilman might wish to invest
in crime prevention only up to the point at which the city pays no
more for additional crime prevention than it saves in losses pre-
vented,10 but no such calculation is possible unless the many functions
of the police are separated, and a cost attributed to each of them.
With the present budgetary system, city officials and the public must
wait for fairness and efficiency to emerge spontaneously from within
the police department.
Since the City Council has no way of identifying wasteful or unde-
sirable police practices, its members economize in the only way the
budget permits: by not appropriating enough funds to put radios in
patrol cars, for example, or by refusing each year to replace the police
department's ancient typewriters. 1
But it is difficult to control law enforcement policy with empty
storerooms and triplicate requisitions. The device of a program budget
allows the public to observe and modify police practices. A program
budget shows how much an organization is spending on each of its
various jobs. It does not attempt to show in detail what an organi-
zation buys-the exact sums spent for manpower, gasoline, or office
supplies. Rather it attempts to show what an organization does-in
the case of the police, how much money is to be spent for investigation,
patrol, and arrest. One possible format for a police program budget
is shown below in outline form.12
A budget following this kind of format would show the emphasis
which the police give to each major task, such as crime suppression
and crime investigation. If the police were also required to furnish
such information for particular regions of a city, imbalance in their
services would be visible.
The use of program documents is well within the ability of most
police departments, especially those in large cities. First of all, police
work in different cities is similar enough to allow use of a model
10. Cf. Calabresi, The Decision for Accidents: An Approach to Nonjault Allocation
of Costs, 78 HARV. L. REv. 713 (1965).
11. Police officials cited these instances of past economizing during the November,
1966, closed budget hearings for the police department at Hartford, Connecticut.
12. For a more complete model program budget see Appendix, p. 834 inlfra.
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3. Other (Roadblocks, etc.)
B. Crime Investigation
1. Answering calls for service: criminal
a. Crimes involving physical danger
to victim
b. Property crimes not involving
physical danger to victims
c. Moral offenses
2. Investigating crimes
a. Crimes involving physical danger
to victim
b. Property crimes not involving
physical danger to victim
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C. Arrest and Prosecution
1. Arresting suspected offenders
a. Crimes involving ....











F. Research and Development
program budget. Each city government can make such minor modifi-
cations as it wishes in the model budget, but it will not have to create
its own budget format. The program budget in the Appendix to this
note is intended to provide a starting point for the development of
a model budget. Second, data gathering and processing should not
prove unduly burdensome. Detailed information on how officers spend
their time can be gathered with little difficulty in brief sample periods
during the year.13 Although computers may be required for some
stages of the data processing, time-sharing schemes and the introduc-
tion of microcircuitry should radically decrease computer costs in the
near future.' 4 Furthermore, a Presidential proposal now being con-
13. Such data were collected by several municipal police departments for the Presi-
dent's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice. Letter from
Samuel G. Chapman, Assistant Director, to R. James Woolsey, Oct. 24, 1966.
14. Interview with Daniel Ross, Stanford Linear Accelerator Computing Center,
Stanford, California, in Los Angeles, December 25, 1966.
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sidered by Congress would provide federal financing for sixty to ninety
per cent of police planning expenditures.'r
A program budget will require police officials to make explicit their
objectives and priorities. City Councils would then have to take public
responsibility for approving or restricting specific police policies. At
present, the police often disguise their policy choices for tactical rea-
sons, hiding their exercises of discretion behind the myth of "full
enforcement" of the criminal law. They may fear that by acknowledg-
ing their policy decisions they will leave themselves open to public
criticism, or that courts will reverse convictions on the ground of
discriminatory enforcement. 10
But not all the ambiguity in police objectives is calculated. Tradi-
tional management procedures can leave even the police unsure as to
why a certain pattern of enforcement has developed. One good exam-
ple is the common police practice of arresting persons for gambling
only when they are in a group whose members don't know one another.
It is assumed that this is a sure sign that the gambling is "organized."
This policy treats social gambling by the poor more harshly than social
gambling by members of the middle class, because in low-income
neighborhoods purely social gambling for small stakes, usually with
dice, is quite common among unacquainted people. But the practice
is not ordinarily a product of conscious discrimination; rather it has
simply calcified because no one has thought to question the assump-
tion.
Of course a program budget will not instantly expose all police
activities to public view. It will not reveal whether police officers are
habitually rude, but it could reveal, for example, whether the depart-
ment makes it a practice to establish roadblocks on holidays to check
for drinking. If, for example, a 200 man department uses ten men
around the clock on six days a year to establish such roadblocks, this
would require about one-half of one per cent of the total available
man-hours for that year. This figure is large enough to be made a
sub-category of a program budget. Some patterns of discriminatory
15. New York Times, Feb. 12, 1967, § 4 at E7, col. 1.
The reader may ask, with some justification, why sud complex procedures are needed
if the data on Hartford in this note could be gathered without the benefit of a program
budget. First, the data here are insufficient for any kind of detailed planning. Second, city
officials and City Council members might have objections to using the same methods by
which data was gathered for this note. For example, at one point the author found
himself counting several hundred pins in a pin-map on the wall of the Hartford Police
Department conference room.
16. See Comment, The Right to Nondiscriminatory Enforcement of State Penal Laws,
61 CoLum. L. REv. 1103 (1961) and cases cited therein; see also Goldstein, supra note 8.
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service would also be spotlighted. If the police customarily send only
a patrolman to do a cursory investigation of burglaries in the ghetto,
but send a squad of detectives to investigate burglaries of wealthy
homes, this policy would be revealed by the program budget, because
the cost per investigation in the ghetto would be far below the cost
per investigation elsewhere.17
Some police policies, such as the decision to use "aggressive patrol"
in a particular area, may be controlled through the budgetary process
even though the program budget will not itself reveal such policies.18
17. The 1966 budget hearings in Hartford revealed the discriminatory assignment of
patrol forces reported at the beginning of this note. They also showed community duties
which take patrolmen away from their beats. These extra jobs include such tasks as
assuring that out-of-town shoppers at Christmas are directed to unfilled parking lots,
providing a taxi service to garages for persons whose cars have been towed for illegal
parking, and furnishing special traffic direction for employees leaving insurance companies
in the afternoon and for children going to and from catechism classes. These services
seem to benefit almost exclusively the white middle- and upper-class community. The
only service which the police appear to provide for the residents of the ghetto is taking
pregnant women to the hospital when ambulance companies refuse to come for fear of
not being paid. This job appears to take only about 280 man-hours per year, less than
one-tenth as much time as the three other services listed above, but the police contended
that this ambulance work was a major reason for inadequate patrol of the Negro ghetto.
Both the general distribution of the patrol force and the special jobs accepted by the
police in Hartford indicate that the police have a special sensitivity to the needs of the
white middle-class citizens. One reason may be that such persons grow used to having their
demands for service satisfied by the police and consequently are encouraged to request
such service whenever they perceive even the slightest need for it. For example, people
in Hartford who own large homes are encouraged to request the police to check their
houses while they are away on vacation, even though private agencies offer this service.
The Police Department has placed a special car on duty during the summer months to
provide this service at no charge. At the same time, the residents of two public housing
projects in Hartford have been granted special patrolmen only if the projects will pay
them. The police seem to feel that white middle-class citizens have more right to police
services. Once, when the police officials in Hartford were asked why they had first taken a
foot patrolman out of the downtown area and then quickly replaced him, they replied
that a fur store had been burglarized in the area soon after the patrolman was removed,
and that "after all, these people are the big tax-payers."
This general bias in the Hartford Police Department's service is not idiosyncratic.
The most respected municipal police executive in the country, Chicago's Superintendent
of Police 0. W. Wilson, emphasizes that the police need to enlist the support of business-
men's organizations and "influential men" through special tours, rides in patrol cars, etc.
0. WISON, PoLmcE ADrMNIsrRATioN 412-13 (1950). He also notes that the favor of merchants
may be useful if it is necessary to bring pressure on newspapers which are unfriendly to
the police, because merchants have the power to withhold advertising. Id. at 416. This
sort of bias is manifested in different ways from city to city. In Los Angeles, another city
with high standards for the police force, some private groups, such as the California
Taxpayers' Association, are admitted to the private hearings of the City Administrative
Officer. In these hearings many of the effective decisions about the police budget arc
made. Community action groups and civil rights organizations, however, are not admitted.
Interview with John Coombs of the City Administrative Officer's staff, Los Angeles, Dec,
22, 1966. In police departments which are less scrupulously managed than those of Chicago
and Los Angeles it is not surprising that police officials see infinite opportunity to Ilse
their manpower to curry favor with those who can most easily help them or harm them.
In the absence of public review of police policy-making it would be quixotic to expect
the police to behave differently.
18. It may be contended that policies such as these, which are not directly reflected
in program budget categories, should be dealt with outside the budgetary process. If
other procedures seem to be necessary they can of course be instituted, but in many
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Public hearings on a program budget, focusing on such topics as "15
more man-years of patrol for the North Side" rather than "$100,000
more for the police department," will be an effective forum for com-
plaints about the police.
So far we have been discussing the contribution which program
budgeting can make toward discovering and guiding police policy.
Once policy decisions have been made, however, program budgeting
can help police officials use their limited resources efficiently so that
objectives are met at the least possible expense. A formal technique,
known as "cost-effectiveness planning" or "systems analysis," has been
developed to guide efficient resource allocation. This technique was
first designed to help decision-makers discover the costs and benefits
of performing a specific government function by each of several pos-
sible methods. For some government jobs, such as providing irrigation,
it is possible to find a common denominator, such as dollars, for both
the cost of a method and the benefits it will produce. For other jobs,
such as crime control, it is difficult to find any commonly-accepted
quantitative measure of benefits. This does not mean that the tech-
nique is useless for improving efficiency in these tasks. It merely means
that the analysis must compare the cost of each method with the
effectiveness of that method in accomplishing a specific goal, such as
preventing a certain number of crimes against the person. Program
budgeting is the first requirement for efficient allocation by such
methods. An analogy from the Defense Department may help illustrate
this point.
Assume the policy decision has been made to increase the strategic
missile force of the United States. Congress and the Defense Depart-
ment must then decide whether to buy more Polaris missiles, to be
launched from submarines, or more Minuteman missiles, to be
launched from silos within the United States. It would be difficult to
obtain any help toward solving this problem from the information
communities public budget hearings are the traditional forum for complaints about all
sorts of public services. See W. SAYRE AND H. KAUF.MtAN, GOvEmRIXo NEw YonE Crr 6-16-
47 (1960). Also, at public hearings just before their budgets are approved, oficials may
be more receptive to public criticism than in most other circumstances. If such public
discussion is ineffective, certain further steps may be necessary. For example, it may be
that community pressure on City Council members cannot be effective without a public
record of Council members' votes on specific appropriations.
The presentation of a community group's position on the police budget would be a
useful function for a lawyer in a neighborhood legal office. The context is not a legal
one in the narrow sense, but a lawyer's skill in presenting complaints and locating sources
of appeal as well as his sense of bureaucratic structure and administrative process could
be of great help. Cahn & Cahn, The War on Poverty: A Civilian Perspective, 73 YALE
L.J. 1317 (1964).
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supplied by a traditional line-item budget. One could not begin to
learn how much it would cost to be able to fire more of either sort
of missile. Even if everyone knew that the Polaris was twice as effec-
tive as the Minuteman, the choice would not be clear, since each new
Polaris might cost five times as much to produce and deploy. A pro-
gram budget, on the other hand, would bring together in a rough way
all the costs associated with the production and deployment of each
type of missile. It would then be comparatively easy to analyze each
missile system, compare the cost and effectiveness of each, and come to
a decision. The Secretary of Defense need not then be distracted by
the irrelevant question of whether the Navy or the Air Force is more
"entitled" to the funds.
Mutatis mutandis, police administrators face similar problems.
They must decide, for example, whether to patrol an area with one-
man cars, two-man cars, motorcycles, or foot patrolmen. Most patrol-
ling work is done by the officers in the patrol division, but some is
done by detectives, juvenile squad members, and traffic officers. All
of these officers, however, perform many other functions as well. A
budget which indicates only how much patrolmen and detectives cost
the city gives no useful information about the overall cost of the job
of patrolling, much less the cost of each method of patrol. A police
administrator must know how much effort, in man-hours and dollars,
is being expended for each method of patrol before he will even find
it useful to ask questions about the relative effectiveness of each
method.
Police officials are generally skeptical of attempts to analyze police
effectiveness.' 9 This is doubtless due in part to the same sort of insu-
larity which reigned before McNamara came to the Pentagon. But in
part the police have had good cause to be skeptical. Many purported
tests of police effectiveness have been exercises in public relations.
19. Some police officials have attempted to work out manpower allocation schemes
without analyzing effectiveness. One of the earliest attempts was by 0. W. Wilson. See
Wilson, Distribution of Police Patrol Force, PUBLIC ADMuNISraATrON SERvICE (No. 74,
1941). Recently many departments in large cities have begun to use variations of this type
of manpower allocation scheme. See Walton, "Selective Distribution" of Police Patrol
Force (pts. 1-2), 49 J. Cm i. L.C. & P.S. 165, 379 (1958). Such schemes doubtless eliminate
some of the most flagrant misallocations of police manpower, but they are not based on
any systematic measures of the cost of crime and the effectiveness of different methods
of combating it. For example, in one scheme described by Walton, homicide and hub.
cap theft (if the set is worth over $50) are given the same weight in determining manpower
allocation, merely because the FBI labels both of these "Part I Crimes" and uses them
to compile its annual "Index of Crime" for the U.S. See id. at 169. In the same scheme,
radio calls are given 75 per cent as much weight as "Part I Crimes" "because they
represent a clear-cut and tangible demand for police service which can be readily
determined." Id.
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The best-known experiment in police methods was New York City's
"Operation 25" in 1954. Twice the usual force of policemen was in-
stalled in New York's Twenty-Fifth Precinct for a four month period.
All police activities were increased dramatically: patrol forces (foot
and auto), detectives, traffic details, juvenile squads, and administra-
tive staff were all bolstered. By comparing 1954 statistics with those
for the same period in 1953, the police found a sharp reduction of
reported felonies.20
The experiment had two serious shortcomings. No one analyzed
crime rates in adjacent precincts, nor did anyone examine the possi-
bility that a change of any kind in police practices might alter the
apparent crime rate.21 Also the study made no attempt to pinpoint
the effect of any one activity. The Police Commissioner of New York
City stated that one of the experiment's main purposes was to make
a case for a dramatic increase in police manpower.22
Recently, work has been begun on more sophisticated experiments
which seek to pinpoint the effect of specific police practices. Currently
the Computer Center of the St. Louis Police Department is attempt-
ing to test the effectiveness of uninterrupted police patrol. Patrol cars
in the test zone answer no calls for service; these are handled instead
by centrally-based cars. Cars in the control zone answer calls in the
usual manner. Careful records are kept in the test zone, the control
zone, and the area surrounding the test zone to determine whether
criminal activity is being suppressed or simply displaced. In addition,
crimes are recorded as "suppressible" or "non-suppressible" depending
upon their type and location.2
Experiments less rigorous than that in St. Louis may yield ambigu-
ous results. If a city merely tries to change some police practice to
measure the effect on the crime rate, it will usually find that the effect
of the police action is washed out by political and economic changes.
20. Felonious assaults declined 29%., robberies 70%, burglaries 65%, grand larcenies
70%. Police Department, City of New York, Operation 25. at 10-13 (1955).
21. Such an effect, widely known in sodal science experiments, is called the "Hawthorne
effect." It was first noted in an efficiency study of the Western Electric plant at Hawthorne,
Ill. in 1927. The study showed a marked positive effect on workers' productivity merely
because they knew they were participating in an experiment. This effect was much greater
than the impact of positive or negative changes in working conditions. See F. Romrius-
BEGER & W. DicKsoN, MANAGE-FNT AND THE WoRER (1950). Thus in "Operation 25"
a reduction in police manpower might also have produced a fall in the apparent crime
rate if a reduced police force had been told that their efforts were being studied.
22. F. Adams, Foreword to Police Department, City of New York, Operation 25, at
1 (1955).
23. Interview with Scott Hovey, St. Louis Police Department Computer Center, by
telephone, July, 1966.
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This problem is another reason for police skepticism about measure-
ment of efficiency.24 But well designed experiments, such as that in
St. Louis, can correct for all effects except one specific change in police
practice, and can thus yield persuasive results. A police administrator
would then be able to compare the cost of each patrol method with
the effectiveness of that method.
Cost-effectiveness studies, however careful, can give only rough
results. A leading writer in the field emphasizes that unless studies
show that one method is at least two or three times as efficient as
another, the differences are probably small enough that the decision
can be made on other grounds without worrying about efficiency.2U
In addition, these studies cannot resolve hard questions about values
-such as the issue of lives versus property. But they can make it pos-
sible to tell a decision-maker something like this: "Patrol of type A
can probably prevent about $1 million of property loss next year,
reduce the number of serious assaults by thirty or forty, and prevent
five to ten forcible rapes. Patrol of type B is likely to be only about
half as effective as A in preventing property loss, but will probably
be about three times as effective in preventing both rapes and assaults."
Thus, it is at least clear what is at stake in choosing one type of patrol
rather than another.
Thus although results may be rough and value judgments will still
need to be made, studies such as that in St. Louis can be extremely
useful. A police department can use program budgeting to see how
much it now costs to perform each police function. Then cost-effec-
tiveness studies can determine whether the individual functions are
being performed in the most efficient manner.
Program budgeting and systems analysis permit city officials not
only to compare the costs of various police operations, but also to
determine whether some other city agency could perform a traditional
police function at equivalent or lower cost. The scarcity of qualified
policemen and the tension which police patrol can produce in some
parts of a city should encourage the search for alternate forms of
protection.
The police function which might be dealt with most readily by
other city departments is crime suppression. "Pure patrol"-mere
walking or driving-accounts for 50 per cent of patrol force time and
24. 0. WILSON, PoLcE ADNIINISTRATION 7 (1950); cf. W. PARKER, PARKER ON POLIE 200
(0. Wilson ed. 1957).
25. G. Fisher, The Analytical Bases of Systems Analysis 13-14 (Rand Corporation Paper,
May 1966).
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over 30 per cent of most police budgets. The patrolman seeks to sup-
press crime by creating an "impression of omnipresence."20 But it
might be possible to make potential offenders fear discovery in other
ways, such as by improving street lighting. It would be helpful to
compare the costs and the effectiveness of lighting to those of pure
police patrol time. Although the idea of making such comparisons is
not new, program budgeting assures that they will be made syste-
matically, promotes their use, and increases the precision of the data.
Similarly, although police commonly check the doors of commercial
establishments at night, Oakland, California, has recently experi-
mented with a compulsory burglar alarm ordinance, a measure which
may prove to be both more effective and less costly than door checks
by patrolmen.27
It is too early to say whether program budgeting for the police will
turn out to be more significant because it lays a groundwork for im-
proved efficiency or because it shatters the police's monopoly on policy-
making. Either offers a persuasive case for its adoption.
APPENDIX
A detailed program budget such as the one outlined below will be
necessary in order to bring about effective public and City Council
control of police policies. Of course, the use of such a budget format
does not guarantee such control. In Los Angeles, for example, it was
claimed ten years ago that the police used a variety of program budget-
ing called "performance budgeting."2 8 In fact the police department
itself does make a detailed breakdown of expenditures within each
department,-9 but this breakdown is never seen by the City Council.
The latter sees only the figures for the ten basic categories of police
work, such as traffic, juvenile delinquency, and supply30
In the budget below, the districts which are indicated need not
coincide exactly with police patrol districts. The budget districts may
be selected for their socio-economic homogeneity in order to deter-
mine whether the police are following different policies toward dif-
ferent social groups. The "cost" categories refer to the cost, in police
time, of providing the services listed. They do not refer to the value
of property stolen.
26. 0. WnisoN, PoricE AnmaNisrRA-oN 81 (1950).
27. See Am. SoC. FOR IrnDusnlIA SEcuRrrY, PRoc. or 1rni ANN. SmuInAR 91 (Atlanta,
Ga., Oct. 1965) (remarks of Lt. K. Martensen, Oakland, Calif. Police Dept.).
28. IV. PARKER, PARKER ON PouicE 90-92 (0. Wilson ed. 1957).
29. The time spent by the patrol force is not, however, broken down into its com-
ponent parts, as is suggested here.
80. Interview with John Coombs of the City Administrative Officer's staff, Los Angeles,
Dec. 22, 1966.
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2. Investigating reported criminal acts
a. Crimes involving physical
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C. Arrest and Prosecution
1. Arresting suspected offenders
a. Crimes involving physical
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2. Assisting prosecution (time in
court, etc.)
a. Crimes involving physical
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F. Research and Development
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